Gerry Redman

Contents

Introduction

A. The Biblical View

1. The Two Natures
2. Definition of ‘Nature’ and ‘Person’
3. The Meaning of ‘Unipersonality’
4. The Nature of the Incarnation and Hypostatic Union
5. Communication of Properties
6. Kenotic Theories
7. The Necessity of the Hypostatic Union
8. Christological Errors
9. Historic Christian Creeds and Confessions

B. The Islamic view

Conclusion

References

Introduction

One of the great failures of Muslims in terms of their apologetic stance against
Christianity, both with regard to the Qur’an and modern Islamic polemics is
the absence of any detailed examination of the Christian doctrine of the Hypostatic
Union – the dogma that Jesus is simultaneously divine and human whilst
yet one person. The Qur’an, it will be seen, never addresses this issue. Among
modern Islamic polemicists, there appears to be a definite shyness about investigating
the topic. For example, Baagil in his supposed discourse with a Christian presents
the latter as stating that Jesus ‘…is both God and man’, whilst the Muslim respondent
merely limits himself to rhetorically querying if Jesus actually claimed that? 1
Ahmed Deedat has published a booklet entitled The God that never was,
that essentially examines texts dealing with the human nature of Jesus,
and presents this as ‘God’ doing human physical functions. 2
Yet Deedat could not have been unaware that the historical Christian position
is that Christ was both divine and human.

Of course, the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union is a supernatural paradox –
that Jesus could be simultaneously finite and infinite, etc., but then, God’s
dealings with humanity are not subject to human patterns of thought. Human beings
are finite, and liable both to sin and err. The finite mind cannot fathom the
mysteries of God. Ultimately, God can only be known through His own self-revelation.
Only the infinite can express the infinite. Yet the infinite must be expressed
in terms of the finite because it is revealed to the finite. Hence, the Incarnation
is a necessary action because of revelation alone – God, taking human nature
alongside His divine nature, expresses the infinite in terms of the finite.
Thus, Jesus reveals the divine nature in terms of His holiness, His love, His
power, and His revelatory action. For this reason Jesus is the supreme revelation
of God – He reveals the Father, John 1:18; whoever has seen Him has seen the
Father. He who is God is also the Word of God. He is the climax of revelation,
Hebrews 1:1-2. To encounter Him is to encounter God Himself, and thus experience
the infallible revelation.

Islam agrees with Christianity that God can only be fully known through His
self-revelation, since the finite reason of Man cannot comprehend the infinitude
of deity. Left to fallible native reason, human beings would always conceive
God in terms with which they could understand, with respect to features with
which they were familiar. That is, men always seek for analogy. Analogy
has its limits with regard to God, precisely because He is unlimited, and, moreover,
incomparable, since there is only one, unique deity – a tenet of faith common
to Islam and the Bible. Clearly, the concept of the Hypostatic Union has no
consistent analogy in nature.

Another point of commonality between Islam and Christianity is belief in the
incomprehensibility of God. This is a consequence of the unique, transcendent
nature of deity, and of human finitude. All human attempts to comprehend Him
apart from revelation are inadequate and doomed to failure. Berkhof notes that
this was the teaching of the Protestant Reformers:

To Calvin, God in the depths of His being is past finding out. ‘His
essence’, he says, ‘is incomprehensible; so that His divinity escapes all
human senses.’ The Reformers do not deny that man can learn something of
the nature of God from His creation, but maintain that he can acquire true
knowledge of Him only from special revelation, under the illuminating influence
of the Holy Spirit. 3

This is a position with which Muslims are bound to agree. For example, one
Muslim writer observes the following about the incomprehensibility of God: ‘But
to have complete knowledge of God is beyond man’s ability. Man is finite and
Allah is infinite…The creature cannot comprehend the Creator; “They (mankind)
cannot encompass Him (Allah) with their knowledge”. Ta-ha, 20:110.
Islam preaches that mankind should only refer to Allah as He has referred to
Himself. There is no scope what-so-ever for inventing new ideas about Him or
thinking of Him in a manner that suits us.’ 4
Similarly, Yusuf Ali comments on S. 112:

The nature of Allah is here indicated to us in a few words, such as
we can understand.

The qualities of Allah are described in numerous places elsewhere, e.g.,
in lix. 22-24, lxii. 1, and ii. 255. Here we are specially taught to avoid
the pitfalls into which men and nations have fallen at various times in
trying to understand Allah. The first thing we have to note is that His
nature is so sublime, so far beyond our limited conceptions, that the best
way in which we can realise Him is to feel that He is a Personality, ‘He’,
and not a mere abstract conception of philosophy. He is near us; He cares
for us; we owe our existence to Him. Secondly, He is the One and Only God,
the Only One to Whom worship is due; all Other things or beings that we
can think of are His creatures and in no way comparable to Him. Thirdly,
He is Eternal, without beginning or end, Absolute, not limited by time or
place or circumstance, the Reality. Fourthly, we must not think of Him as
having a son or a father, for that would be to import animal qualities into
our conception of Him. Fifthly, He is not like any other person or thing
that we know or can imagine: His qualities and nature are unique.

The divergence between Islam and Christianity begins when we consider the identity
of divine self-revelation. Islam claims it is the Qur’an; Christianity holds
that it is found in the Bible and supremely in Jesus Christ as the Word of God.
Hence, Muslims can scarcely object to the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union because
it is paradoxical and does not conform to their ideas of human reason, for the
very reason that finite human reason is incapable of comprehending the divine
essence, and thus fully understanding the Hypostatic Union. The great Princeton
theologian A. A. Hodge observed that the very nature of the Incarnation does
not allow for adequate analogy or comprehensibility:

The Person of the incarnate God is unique. His birth has had no precedents
and his existence no analogy. He cannot be explained by being referred to
a class, nor can he be illustrated by an example… This unique personality,
as it surpasses all analogy, also transcends all understanding. The proud
intellect of man is constantly aspiring to remove all mysteries and to subject
the whole sphere of existence to the daylight of rational explanation. Such
attempts are constantly ending in the most grotesque failure. Even in the
material world it is true that omnia exeunt in mysterium. If we cannot
explain the relation which the immaterial soul sustains to the organized
body in the person of man, why should We be surprised to find that all attempts
to explain the intimate relations which the eternal Word and the human soul
and body sustain to each other in the Person of Christ have miserably failed? 5

This paper will attempt to explain the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union to
Muslims, illustrating how Jesus is concurrently divine and human. It
will also study what the Qur’an has to say on the subject, and consider the
implications of Qur’anic Christology, both in terms of what it denies, and what
it presents as Christian doctrine.

A. The Biblical view

1. The Two Natures

Although this is not the place for an extended treatment of either the humanity
or deity of Christ, it is as well to give a short overview of some of the evidence
for both these doctrines.

(a) Humanity of Christ

Today, this doctrine is rarely questioned, though we shall see that this
was not always the case. We should firstly observe that whilst the conception
of Jesus was supernatural, He had a normal human birth, Matthew 1:25, Luke
2:7, Galatians 4:4. Also, He experienced a normal human development – Luke 2:40-52,
Hebrews 5:8. He ‘grew’ in wisdom. His Messianic consciousness begins to find
expression at the age of twelve, and is perfected at the Baptism – Luke 3:22.

Jesus spoke of Himself as a Man, John 8:40, and is so termed by others – Acts
2:22, 1 Corinthians 15:21. He had a body and soul – Matthew 26:26, 38, Luke
24:39. He was subject to human wants and sufferings – Matthew 4:2, 8:24: hunger
- Matthew 21:18; thirst – Matthew 11:19; weariness – John 4:6. He experienced
true agony – Mark 14:33-36. Also, He genuinely knew the emotions of love – John
1:5, sorrow, Matthew 26:37, and anger Mark 3:5. In order to be the antitype
of Adam, ‘bearer of destiny’ Romans 5:17ff, He must be true Man.

As a true man He worships the Father – Luke 4:16, and prays – 3:21, 6:12. He
had, as a man, limited knowledge – Mark 6:38, Luke 2:46, Mark 13:32.
However, it must be noted that He was sinless – Hebrews 4:15 – John 8:46, 2
Corinthians 5:21, Hebrews 9:14, 1 Peter 2:22, 1 John 3:5. He resisted temptation.
He was not a superman, but a true man filled with the Holy Spirit; His miracles
are performed in the power of the Spirit.

(b) Deity of Christ

This is explicitly taught in John 1:1 – ‘the Word was God’; Greek scholars
unanimously reject the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ New World Translation perversion.
Michael Bremmer’s article The Deity of Jesus Christ explores the magisterial
work of Walter Martin on the Watchtower cult, and their distortion of this verse,
a mistranslation that is beginning to be employed by Muslim apologists. 6
The Word was God. The syntax of John 1:1 is instructive in this regard, by virtue
of placing the definite predicate before the verb but without the definite article
(‘Colwell’s rule’):

‘En arxh ‘hn ‘o logos, kai ‘o logos ‘hn pros ton qeon, kai qeos ‘hn ‘o logos.

Not only does it affirm that Jesus (the Word) is God, it also demonstrates
that the Godhead is not exhausted in Jesus, that is, that Jesus is not alone
God, but rather there are more persons than the Son in the Godhead. Jesus is
called ‘Lord’ – kurios – Jews used this to render ‘YHWH’, and we find
it employed in Romans 10:9 – ‘confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord’. John 8:58
presents Him as claiming the personal name of God, ‘I am’ (YHWH). Cf. also Colossians
1:15; 2:9; Philippians 2:6-11; 2 Thessalonians 1:12; Hebrews 1:8-10; 1 John
5:20. Jesus, in John 5:22-23, states that all men may give Him equal honour
as to the Father, and since the honour we give to God is worship, Jesus must
be God. It is clear from John 5:18-19 that the Jews recognised Jesus as claiming
deity.

YHWH is Shepherd of Israel – Psalm 23:1; Jesus is God Shepherd – John 10:11-16.
Other texts pointing to the deity of Christ include John 20:28 – ‘My Lord and
My God’; Acts 20:28 – ‘the church of God which He purchased with His own blood.’
It is likely that John 1:18 affirms the deity of Christ – ‘No man has seen God
at any time; the only begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has
revealed Him.’ The Greek makes this more explicit yeon ‘oudeiv ‘ewraken pwpote monogenhv yeov ‘o

‘wn ‘eiv ton kolpon tou patrov ‘ekeinov‘exhghsato.

Romans 9:5 presents Jesus as ‘God over all’ – the context of sorrow over Israel’s
fall precludes a doxology, and such does not usually appear in the middle of
a passage. Doxologies usually refer to someone mentioned in the preceding sentence
- Romans 1:25; 11:26; 2 Corinthians 11:31; Galatians 1:5; 2 Timothy 4:18. Whenever
‘euloghtov
(‘blessed’) is used in an independent doxology, it always stands at the beginning
of a sentence, e.g. 2 Corinthians 1:3; Ephesians 1:1; 1 Peter 1:3. As it stands,
‘God over all’ balances ‘concerning the flesh’. Christ is God over all.

Romans 14:10 refers to the Judgment Seat of God, and 2 Corinthians 5:10 ascribes
it to Christ. Titus 2:13 speaks of the ‘great God and Saviour Jesus Christ,
as does 2 Peter 1:1. If God and Jesus were distinguished, there would normally
need to be a definite article before ‘Saviour’, but it is absent, so the texts
affirm Christ’s deity. Revelation 1:17, 18; 2:8; 22:12, 13, 16 all refer to
Jesus as Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End – used of God in Isaiah
41:4; 44:6; 48:12.

2. Definition of ‘Nature’ and ‘Person’

The Greek word hypostasis ‘upostasiv
essentially means ‘substance’, hence its employment in Hebrews 11:1. The
Christological controversies of the Early Church were often reducible to semantics,
rather than concrete issues. Often it was because one word was used in a certain
way in one area (e.g. Antioch) whilst a different area employed it otherwise
(e.g. Alexandria) that problems arose. Nonetheless, the formula that was eventually
accepted essentially made hypostasis equivalent to ‘person’, hence it
is said that there are three hypostases in one divine essence – ousia
‘ousia. Probably the best definition
is that of ‘the essence of an individual in virtue of which it is itself’. Thus,
equivalent to ‘person’.

The Greek word translated as ‘nature’ is fusiv
phusis (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:14; James 3:7). This is best understood
as a substance (essence, being) possessed in common. Berkhof gives a helpful
aid to definition:

The term ‘nature’ denotes the sum-total of all the essential qualities
of a thing, that which makes it what it is. A nature is a substance possessed
in common, with all the essential qualities of such a substance. The term
“person” denotes a complete substance endowed with reason, and,
consequently, a responsible subject of its own actions. Personality is not
an essential and integral part of a nature but is, as it were, the terminus
to which it tends. A person is a nature with something added, namely, independent
subsistence, individuality. Now the Logos assumed a human nature that was
not personalized, that did not exist by itself. 7

3. The Meaning of ‘Unipersonality’

a) Not Adoptionism

The Second Person of the Trinity does not in a charismatic way endue
a distinct human person. There is perfect identity between Jesus of Nazareth
and God the Son. Rather, the eternal Word came as flesh on the human scene –
John 1:14.

b) Not Bi-Personality

As implied above, there are not two beings i.e. ‘persons.’ in the Mediator;
only two natures. Berkhof points out that there is no ‘distinction of ‘I’ and
‘Thou’ in the inner life of the Mediator, such as we find in the triune Being
of God, where one person addresses the other… Jesus never uses the plural in
referring to Himself.’ 8

c) Not Docetism/Impersonality

The humanity of Christ is genuine, so docetism is untenable; and in order to
be truly human, Jesus as a man must possess all that is native to human nature,
He had a human mind, spirit, tastes, needs, will and all else that corresponds
to the inner and exterior life of a normal man. Thus, the humanity of Christ
may be said to be ‘personal’ without being a person – i.e. it does not possess
an independent subsistence. We will examine this further later.

d) Not Metamorphosis

We are not presented with a case of metamorphosis whereby God the Son changes
into a man, in the same manner as humans change into animals or vice versa
in legends or fairy tales, Rather, the integrity of the deity is preserved.
Without ceasing to be divine, God the Son assumes another (i.e. human) nature
alongside His deity. John Murray observes in relation to John 1:14 ‘…lest we
should interpret the incarnation in terms of transmutation or divestiture, John
hastens to inform us that, in beholding the incarnate Word, they beheld his
glory as the glory of the only-begotten from the Father (John 1:14)… he proceeds
to identify the only-begotten in his unabridged character as “God only-begotten
who is in the bosom of the Father (v. 18).’ 9

4. The Nature of the Incarnation and Hypostatic Union

The Second Person of the Trinity, whilst remaining God, assumed a human nature
alongside His divine nature. This means we are dealing with the same Person
who appeared to Moses and Joshua, the same Person who created the Cosmos. Deity
being immutable and impassible, no change occurs in the Divine Logos. He remains
the Creator and Maintainer of all things. We thus are presented with a Jesus
who is at one point designated by the divine title, Acts 20:28; 1 Corinthians
2:8; Colossians 1:13, 14, and likewise with regard to the human title – John
3:13; 6:62; Romans 9:5. Berkhof clearly presents the Evangelical position on
this complex issue:

There is but one person in the Mediator, the unchangeable Logos. The
Logos furnishes the basis for the personality of Christ… The human nature
of Christ as such does not constitute a human person. The Logos did not
adopt a human person, so that we have two persons in the Mediator, but simply
assumed a human nature… At the same time it is not correct to speak of the
human nature of Christ as impersonal. This is true only in the sense that
this nature has no independent subsistence of its own. Strictly speaking,
however, the human nature of Christ was not for a moment impersonal. The
Logos assumed that nature into personal subsistence with Himself. The human
nature has its personal existence in the person of the Logos. It is in-personal
rather than impersonal. For that very reason we are not warranted to speak
of the human nature of Christ as imperfect or incomplete. His human nature
is not lacking in any of the essential qualities belonging to that nature,
and also has individuality, that is, personal subsistence, in the person
of the Son of God. 10

A. A. Hodge presents a similar picture, emphasising that what has occurred
is that the eternal Second Person of the Trinity has assumed another nature,
not adopted another person, whilst retaining His deity:

Again: the Scriptures teach us that this amazing personality does not
centre in his humanity, and that it is not a composite one originated by
the power of the Spirit when he brought the two natures together in the
womb of the Virgin Mary. It was not made by adding manhood to Godhead. The
Trinity is eternal and unchangeable. A new Person is not substituted for
the second Person of the Trinity, neither is a fourth Person added to the
Trinity But the Person of Christ is just the one eternal Word, the second
Person of the Trinity, which in time, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through
the instrumentality of the womb of the Virgin, took a human nature (not
a man, but the seed of man, humanity in the germ) into personal union with
himself. The Person is eternal and divine. The humanity is introduced into
it. The centre of the personality always continues in the eternal personal
Word or Son of God. 11

Against all adoptionist positions, this position must be emphasised – that
the eternal Son of God assumed an individual human person. Neither was
it simply a human body that He assumed, but rather human nature in its
entirety – John 1:14 means this. It is usually presented that the human nature
of Christ is in-personal, rather than impersonal – i.e. the human
nature has no independent entity. It is important to note that this does not
mean that the humanity possesses no free will or consciousness. This view is
termed Enhypostasia; another view is Anhypostasia – view that
the humanity of Christ was impersonal – He assumed ‘Man’, rather than becoming
a man. The modern and very able theologian Bruce Milne explains these terms:

This terminology was coined in the 6th century by Leontius during discussions
of the identity of the personal centre, the self-conscious ‘I’, of Jesus Christ.
If this self-conscious ‘I’ was the divine Word, the human nature assumed lacked
a human self-consciousness; this looked dangerously like the Apollinarian
denial of Christ’s true humanity and hence of his fitness to act as our redeemer.
The contrary theory, of a full human self-consciousness in Christ independent
of and alongside the Logos, threatened the integrity of the incarnation as
an act by which the pre-existent Son of God became man, and also gave rise
to another person alongside and independent of the Logos, i.e. Jesus of Nazareth,
who is then not the eternal Son of God and can neither reveal God nor bring
God’s salvation to us.

Leontius proposed that, negatively, the human self-conscious ‘I’ had no
existence of its own; it existed only within the hypostatic union with the
Logos (Gk. an = without, hence anhypostasia).

Positively, he proposed that it is present and real only in (Gk.
en) the divine ‘I’ (hence enhypostasia). This permits the assertion
of full manhood but retains the biblical recognition that the essential self-hood
of the God-man is that of the eternal Son and Word of God who effectually
reveals God and brings divine salvation to mankind. 12

A. N. S. Lane has described the difference succinctly, in noting how the Chalcedonian
Definition met the challenges of both Nestorianism and Monophysitism: ‘the human
nature of Christ is not merely anhypostasic (without a hypostasis), but
enhypostasic in the Logos – i.e. the hypostasis of Christ’s human nature
is that of God the Logos.’ 13

5. Communication of Properties

The obvious question that arises at this point is ‘what effect has the Hypostatic
Union on the distinct natures of Christ?’ An extremely helpful answer to the
query and exposition of the relationship of the two natures has been supplied
by Stuart Olyott’s book Son of Mary, Son of God, in which he discusses
the effects of the union on both natures:

His divine nature, being a divine nature, was of course eternal, immutable
and incapable of addition, and therefore remained essentially unchanged. The
whole immutable divine essence continued to exist as the person of the eternal
Word, but now embraced a perfect human nature in the unity of his person.
That human nature became the instrument of his will. In this way the relation
of the divine nature to creation changed, although the nature itself remained
unaltered. The eternal Son of God was now ‘God with us’ (Matthew 1:23), God
‘manifest in the flesh’ (1 Timothy 3:16). Of course, the divine nature of
Christ remained incapable of suffering and death, free from ignorance, and
insusceptible to weakness and temptation. It was not a divine nature which
had assumed flesh, but the Son of God as person who had become incarnate.
He could be ignorant and weak, and could suffer and die. This was because
he had assumed an additional nature capable of these things, and not because
there had been any change in his divine nature…

The human nature of Christ …never had any existence apart from him, and
therefore was exalted from its very inception … its exaltation did not stop
it being an unmixed and essentially unchanged human nature. It was not deified
by the hypostatical union, but remained pure and separate humanity… Not only
so, but his human nature is included in the worship due to him. The grounds
upon which we worship him are that he is the eternal Son of God, possessed
of divine attributes. But the object of our worship is not the divine excellences
in the abstract, but the divine person. That person has two natures. We bow
before a man, not because any man as man is to be adored, but because this
particular man is God manifest in the flesh. He is the God-Man, at whose feet
we fall unashamed. 14

A. A. Hodge makes the important observation of the Unipersonality of Jesus
concerning His two natures, emphasising that we are not dealing with a hybrid
individual, but rather One in whom the natures retain their integrity, yet what
can be postulated of one nature can be ascribed to the Person:

Pointing to that unique phenomenon exhibited biographically in the four
Gospels, the Scriptures affirm – (a) ‘He is God.’ Then we would naturally
say, if he is God, he cannot be man; if he is infinite, he cannot be finite.
But the Scriptures proceed to affirm, pointing to the same historical subject,
‘He is man.’ Then, again, we would naturally say, if that phenomenon is both
God and man, he must be two Persons in reality, and one Person only in appearance.
But yet again the Scriptures prevent us, In every possible way they set him
before us as one Person. His divinity is never objective to his humanity,
nor his humanity to his divinity. His divinity never loves, speaks to, nor
sends his humanity, but both divinity and humanity act together as the common
energies of one Person. All the attributes and all the acts of both natures
are referred to the one Person. The same ‘I’ possessed glory with the Father
before the world was, and laid down his life for his sheep. Sometimes in a
single proposition the title is taken from the divine side of his Person,
while the predicate is true only of his human side, as when it is said, ‘The
Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood.’ The same Person
is called God because of his divinity, while it is affirmed that he shed his
human blood for his Church. Again: while standing among his disciples on the
earth, he says, ‘The Son of man, which is in heaven.’ Here the same Person,
who is called Son of man because of his humanity, is declared to be omnipresent
– that is, at the same time on earth and in heaven — as to his divine nature.
This, of course, implies absolute singleness of Person, including at once
divine and human attributes. 15

It is vital to note that there is never any communication from one nature to
the other, only to the Person. Olyott’s treatment of the subject is extremely
helpful in regard to this issue:

We must be clear that the properties of both the human and the divine
natures of Christ are the properties of the person that he is. The person
can be said to be almighty, omnisicient, omnipresent, and so on. He can also
be called a man of sorrows, of limited knowledge and power, and subject to
human want and miseries. But we must be careful to guard against thinking
that anything belonging to his divine nature was communicated or transferred
to the human nature, or vice versa. Christ shared in human weaknesses, although
the Deity cannot. Christ participates in the essential perfections of the
Godhead, although humanity cannot. This is possible because he is one person,
the God-Man. We do not have to postulate any change in either of his natures,
although we are admitting that their union did not leave them unaffected. 16

Christian Systematic Theology has historically explained the relationship of
the two natures to the One Person by employing the following grid:

a) Communicatio Idiomatum

The properties of either nature are now ascribed to the Person. Hence Jesus
is both finite and infinite, omnipotent and limited in power, etc. – hence Jesus
could amaze (and outrage) His hearers by claiming pre-existence and deity –
e.g. John 8:58; cf. Romans 9:5; Hebrews 1:3.

b) Communicatio Charismatum

Gratia habitualis – Christ as a man is filled with the Holy Spirit (N.B.
this is without limit – John 3:34). He lives and ministers as such – a man of
faith, endowed with the gifts of the Spirit. Many theologians speak of a gratia
unionis – the ‘grace and glory of being united to the divine Logos’. A.
A. Hodge stated ‘The God-man…. is to be worshipped in the perfection of his
entire person, because only of his divine attributes’. 17

c) Communicatio Operantium

The One, undivided Person acts continually in all His actions. His work is
divine-human. The two natures co-operate, working parallel – indeed act as one,
within the qualification of operating in the sphere of its own energeia.
There is no conflict between the two natures.

The last word on this subject belongs to the great systematic theologian T.
C. Hammond:

…while the two natures were united, they were not inter-mingled and altered
in their individual properties, so that there resulted a third type of substance
which was neither divine nor human… there were not transfers of attributes
from one to the other, such as a human characteristic transferred to the divine,
nor was our Lord’s deity reduced to human limitations… the union was not
an indwelling such as the indwelling of the Christian by the Spirit of God,
but a personal union such that the resulting being was a unit, who thought
and acted as a unit. While each nature retained its own properties they were
not held together merely as though the hypostatic union was a ring thrown
around two incompatible elements. There was a real harmony. 18

6. Kenotic Theories

Philippians 2:6ff, especially v7, speaks of Christ ‘emptying’ Himself. What
did this involve? Of what did He empty Himself? That question has exercised
scholars, particularly Lutherans:

(a) Thomasius, Delitzsch, and Crosby

These scholars distinguished between the absolute and essential attributes
of God, e.g. absolute power, holiness, love and truth; and relative attributes
- omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. The latter are laid aside – the
argument is that doing so is essential to human nature.

(b) Gess and Beecher

They held that the Logos divested Himself of divine attributes – that He ceased
from cosmic functions and emptied Himself of eternal consciousness during His
time of earthly sojourn. The depotentiated Logos took the place of His human
soul.

(c) Ebrard

As with Gess, Ebrard held that the Incarnate Logos took the place of the human
soul in Christ. His life-centre is human, but He continued the exercise of His
divine qualities in the Trinitarian sphere.

(d) Martensen and Gore

They proposed that Jesus had two non-communicating life-centres; He continued
to function in Trinitarian sphere, and as Creator/Sustainer; but the depotentiated
Logos was unaware of His cosmic functions.

Critique

i) It is based on a misunderstanding of Philippians 2:7
– ‘ekenwsen ekenosen, aorist of
kenoo, is best rendered ‘to make oneself of no account’; other texts
employing the verb, Romans 4:14; 1 Corinthians 1:17; 9:15; 2 Corinthians 9:3
clarify its meaning as ‘no account’, ‘no effect’ or ‘no reputation’.

ii) Proper exegesis of Philippians 2 displays that the
import of the passage is not the elucidation of either the Incarnation or the
deity of Christ, but rather Paul’s admonition to believers to as humble-minded
as Christ was, cf. v5. There is an obvious allusion to the First Sin, where
Adam ‘grasped’ at equality with God, Genesis 3:5, seeking a place which higher
than his own, and not his by right, so that far from being the servant of God,
he would be His equal, and rather than being an entity that was dependent upon
God for his existence, he would be possessed of aseity. Jesus was divine by
right, and was subject of angelic adoration and heavenly glory, yet He voluntarily
relinquished such a position in order to take the place of a servant, and for
from sinning, He was totally obedient; far from grasping at life, He suffered
ignominious death. In this, He was the perfect example to believers.

iii) God is eternal and immutable, so it is impossible for Him to be divested
of His attributes. Jesus therefore did not relinquish His divine attributes.
We find the disciples in Acts performing many of the same miracles as
Jesus, yet unlike them, Jesus accepts worship; thus He remains God even in the
State of Humiliation; this is the mystery of God Incarnate.

7. The Necessity of the Hypostatic Union

Why was it necessary for God to take human nature? What is the necessity of
Christ having two natures? Firstly, it was necessary because the Covenant demanded
it. The Covenant promise to the Patriarchs was ‘I will be their God, they will
be my People, and I will dwell in their midst’ – Genesis 17:7-8 ‘And I will
establish My covenant between Me and you and your offspring after you throughout
their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto you and to your
seed after you. 8 And I will give to you, and to your seed offspring you, the
land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession;
and I will be their God.’ Exodus 29:45 ‘And I will dwell among the children
of Israel, and will be their God.’; Leviticus 26:12 ‘And I will walk among you,
and will be your God, and you shall be My people.’ 2 Corinthians 6:16 ‘for we
are a temple of the living God; even as God said, I will dwell in them, and
walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people.’; Revelation
21:3 ‘Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He shall dwell with them,
and they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be with them, and be their
God’.

Ultimately, for the covenant promise to be realised, God must dwell in the
midst of His people. In the Old Testament, the typological manifestation of
this was the Tabernacle and later the Temple, the latter essentially being a
concrete, permanent version of the former. The Tabernacle/Temple was the place
of divine indwelling, and also the place where God revealed Himself to Man,
where sacrifice and thus reconciliation took place, and where the worship of
God was effected. When John 1:14 states that ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt
among us’, the Greek word used for ‘dwell’ is eskénósen ‘eskhnwsen,
which actually means ‘tabernacled’. So, in a further development from the dwelling-place
of God in earlier times, God no longer dwells by His Name on the earth in something
made by human hands, but dwells physically by virtue of the Incarnation. Thus,
the eternal Word, as flesh, entered the human scene and tabernacled among us.
Christ came specifically to redeem Man by the Cross, and His death is the means
of the New Covenant, Luke 22:20.

Secondly, as we suggested earlier, only God can ultimately reveal God. Every
other means has its limitations, since God alone is infinite, and everything
else is finite. Therefore, the ultimate self-revelation of God can only result
from His ontological auto-disclosure. However, it is impossible for Man
to see the divine glory and remain alive, as God revealed to Moses, Exodus 33:20
‘You cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live.’ In some way, this
divine self-revelation must be veiled; the Incarnation allows for this. In this
sense, Jesus is the ultimate Revelation of God to Man – John 1:18 ‘No man has
seen God at any time; God the only begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father,
has made Him known’; Hebrews 1:1-2 ‘God, who in previous times spoke to the
fathers by the prophets in many portions and in various ways, has in these last
days spoken unto us by His Son…’ As Olyott states:

It is because of his divine nature that he is a perfect Prophet. Other
prophets could do no more than reflect his light, or pass on what they had
received from him. All their knowledge was second hand. But the Lord Jesus
Christ is God himself. His incarnation has meant that human eyes and ears
have seen and heard the one who has been sent by God, who is God. We have
received a perfect revelation of God, perfectly suited to our humanity. But
we would have had no such Prophet, and no such revelation, if the one person
had not been possessed of two distinct natures. 19

For redemptive purposes it was essential that the Redeemer be simultaneously
God and Man. Only a sinless, perfect Man could render the perfect active and
passive obedience essential for redemption, and since every man in born subject
to original sin, a divine miracle was essential – God assuming human nature.
Berkhof writes:

It was necessary that Christ should assume human nature, not only with
all its essential properties, but also with all the infirmities to which it
is liable after the fall, and should thus descend to the depths of degradation
to which man had fallen, Heb. 2:7, 18. At the same time, He had to be a sinless
man, for a man who was himself a sinner and who had forfeited his own life,
certainly could not atone for others, Heb. 7:26. 20

It is actually at the point of redemption that the necessity for the simultaneous
divine and human natures of Christ becomes most apparent. Both natures were essential
for the activity of appeasing the wrath of God against sin, and paying the price
of divine retribution against human rebellion. To quote Berkhof again:

In the divine plan of salvation it was absolutely essential that the Mediator
should also be very God. This was necessary, in order that (1) He might bring
a sacrifice of infinite value and render perfect obedience to the law of God;
(2) He might hear the wrath of God redemptively, that is, so as to free others
from the curse of the law; and (3) He ‘might be able to apply the fruits of
His accomplished work to those who accepted Him by faith. Man with his bankrupt
life can neither pay the penalty of sin, nor render perfect obedience to God.
He can bear the wrath of God and, except for the redeeming grace of God, will
have to bear it eternally, but he cannot bear it so as to open a way of escape,
Ps. 49:740; 130:3…Since man sinned, it was necessary that the penalty should
be borne by man. Moreover, the paying of the penalty involved suffering of
body and soul, such as only man is capable of bearing, John 12:27; Acts 3:18;
Heb. 2:14; 9:22. 21

Likewise Olyott writes about the effect of the two natures upon the redemptive
activity of Christ:

The human nature of Christ was necessary for him to keep God’s law on
our behalf, to die in our place, and to be our representative Priest and sympathetic
Intercessor in heaven. At the same time it is only the supreme dignity of
his divine person which ensures that his obedience was of sufficient merit
to justify sinners, and that his finite death was of infinite value, and therefore
a sufficient satisfaction for divine justice. We would never have had the
Priest that we need if the one person had not been possessed of two distinct
natures. 22

The Incarnation and the Hypostatic Union also reveal the Love of God in a way
the Islamic view of God fails to do. Christ’s two natures means that we have
a Lord who knows the innermost depths of agony and despair, of hunger, of loneliness
and abandonment, of fear (at the prospect of the cross – Gethsemane). He knows
what it is to have friends desert you, and a companion betray you. Every conceivable
pain, temptation and fear human beings can undergo has been experienced by the
God-Man Jesus: Hebrews 2:17 ‘Therefore in all things he had to be made like
His brothers, that He might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things
pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. 18 For since
He Himself suffered being tempted, he is able to aid those that are tempted.’
Hebrews 4:15 ‘For we do not have a high priest who cannot sympathise with our
infirmities; but One who has been in all points tempted as we are, yet without
sin.’ To quote Berkhof again:

Only such a truly human Mediator, who had experimental knowledge of the
woes of mankind and rose superior to all temptations, could enter sympathetically
into all the experiences, the trials, and the temptations of man, Heb. 2:17-18;
4:15-5:2, and be a perfect human example for His followers, Matt. 11:29; Mk.
10:39; John 13:13.15; Phil. 2:5.8; Heb. 12:2.4; 1 Pet. 2:21. 23

It is in this respect the contrast between the God of the Bible and the God
of Islam becomes so glaring. The God of the Bible may expect His worshippers
to suffer and die for Him, but He has done so already Himself in the person
of Jesus Christ. Everything God demands of us in terms of obedience, even unto
death, He has Himself performed. He demands nothing from us other than what
He has Himself effected. It is different with the God of Islam. He may offer
a sumptuous reward of silks, fruits and maidens to His martyrs, but He commands
of them something He has never done Himself. In Islam, God expects Man to die
for Him; in the Bible, God, in the person of Jesus, dies for Man. Further, we
know and see in Jesus – in the incarnate God – the expression and character
of divine love, not just for those who love Him, as in Islam, but for those
who hate Him – Christ died for His enemies, Romans 5:8 ‘But God demonstrates
His own love toward us, in that, while we were still sinners, Christ died for
us.’ Because of the Hypostatic Union, we have a God who can enter experientially,
rather than just empirically, into human psychology and emotion –
He has been there Himself. How very different is the God of Islam.

It is probably partly because of this lack in Islam that the concept of the
Sunnah and the excessive love of Muhammad have emerged. The God of Islam
is so transcendent and removed from Man, so failing in terms of revealing His
love that there is nothing to stimulate genuine love in return. Nothing suggests
an experimental acquaintance with human fears and emotions. Hence the import
of Muhammad in Islam. However, this is a poor substitute for a God who actually
assumes human nature. This is where the import of John 3:16 becomes so revealing
– ‘God loved the world thus, He sent His unique Son…’ – He sent Him to die for
us, the ultimate focus of human emotional concern. He triumphed over death,
so now we have a man in fact, as our Representative, we have Man – at the throne
of grace. This is something with which Islam cannot adequately compete.

8. Christological Errors

a) Apollinarianism

Apollinarius was Bishop of (Syrian) Laodicea. Apollinarius himself saw his
Christology as a continuation of Alexandrian ‘Word-flesh’ tradition – i.e. the
refusal to admit or give weight to human mind or soul in the God-man. In particular
he saw his theology as continuing the teaching of the fathers who in 268 condemned
the adoptionist dynamic Monarchianism of Paul of Samosata, who distinguished
the eternal Word from Jesus Christ. 24 Partly
as a result of semantic differences, he condemned the Antiochene ‘Dyophysite’
strain (emphasis on two natures) as implying the adoptionist heresy – God enduing
a man or at least indicating a purely moral union between deity and humanity.

Scripture presents Christ as a unity.

To Apollinarius, the term ‘Nature’ was equivalent to ‘Person’. Thus if two
natures are conjoined, then we have two persons. We can see that Apollinarius
was denying a double personality in Christ. Hence, Christ has only one
nature – phusis, a ‘simple, undivided Prosopon‘ (another Greek
word for ‘person’). He also employed hypostasis – self-determining reality.
However, we must be cautious in our understanding of his usage of ‘nature’ and
‘person’; he did not mean that Christ is only divine and not human -
rather, he affirms the humanity of Christ. What he believes is that the Logos
took the place of the soul in the Incarnate Jesus, so that it truly is the same
Person, not two, it remains the Logos, and his flesh is truly human.

He held Man to be a trichotomy – Body, Soul, and Spirit. In Christ the Logos
took the place of the human spirit – the higher rational principle. Apollinarius
was able to do this because he followed Platonic anthropology – the idea that
Man is Tri-partite; Body, Soul and Spirit. The Soul or Mind is the ruling element
in human nature; freedom of choice rests therein. It is this that differentiates
one man from another – the power of self-determination – thus the seat of independent
personality.

The human soul is finite. Moreover, to Apollinarius, humanity was equivalent
to iniquity – the human mind is ‘fallible and enslaved to filthy thoughts’,
but the Logos is immutable. It is vital to recognise that for Apollinarius,
the human soul is the seat of sin. Since only the pure may redeem the
impure, the salvation of humanity is imperilled if Christ possessed a human
mind like ours. Hence we can understand the stress of Apollinarius upon the
need for Christ to have no ordinary human rational element; Apollinarius was
governed by zeal for the deity and sinlessness of Christ.

If the incarnate Christ possessed no ordinary human soul, then he would not
possess the opportunity (i.e. danger) of free choice – and thus be free from
sin and enabled to redeem us. This is made possible by the Logos taking the
place of the soul in Christ; so, rather than being Soma (body), Psuche
(soul), Pneuma (spirit), Christ was Soma, Logos, Pneuma. This did not
undermine the true humanity of Christ, inasmuch as every soul was part of the
Logos, so the distinction between Christ and other men was qualitative in nature.
The same functions of the Mind are fulfilled by the Logos re. intellect and
will – ‘the divine energy fulfils the role of the animating spirit (psuches)
and of the human mind (Nous)’. 25

Strongly anti-Arian, he held tenaciously to the true Deity of Christ. But he
regarded the human spirit as the seat of sin and true human nature as sinful,
and he was concerned to defend the sinlessness of Christ. (It is clear that
this position had affinities with docetism.) The emphasis of the hated Arian
heresy was – in terms of defining the character of the humanity of Christ -
that the Logos had free will in regard to sin. Apollinarius regarded the ability
to sin as the distinctive property of finite nature. If Jesus had a finite
spirit, He could not redeem. Thus, He would not be divine.

Apollinarius did not say that the flesh was a cloak with which the Logos clothed
Himself, but rather that Logos and flesh ‘blended’ – thus an absolute union
with Deity. The Incarnate is ‘compound unity in human form’ – ‘one nature composed
of impassible divinity and passible flesh’. The body could not exist as an independent
nature but rather required an animating force – in the case of ordinary men,
the soul; in the case of Christ, the Logos. Hence, the Logos affects not only
the psychology of Christ, but also his flesh; the biological life of
Christ was also governed by the Logos. This meant that he was free from ordinary
psychic and carnal passions, immune to death and thus enabled to destroy Death.

Following from this, just as an ordinary man is a compound of body and soul
and is thus a unity, so the body of Christ and the Logos are a unity. Moreover,
the flesh of Christ is thereby glorified. (Contrary to his critics, he did not
hold to the pre-existence of the flesh of Christ, nor to its consubstantiality
with God.) If the flesh is so-fused, it may be worshipped, and with regard to
the communicatio idomatum, what is predicated of the flesh may be so of the
Logos and vice versa, and in the Eucharist, the faithful receive the divinised
flesh of Christ and are thereby deified. N.B. Apollinarius held that in the
virgin birth, the divine spirit replaced the spermatic matter which gives life
to ordinary men. One can see the advantages for the traditional conception of
deity as impassible, indivisible and immutable in this presentation.

Apollinarius had the principal concern of defending the unity of the Person
of Christ, for which he was willing to discard the importance of the distinction
of natures and his true humanity. Apollinarianism was controverted by the Cappadocian
Fathers – Basil Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianus. (N.B. Their
theological point of departure was soteriology rather than Christology.)
For Christ to be our Redeemer, He had to be true man as well as true God. ‘What
He has not assumed He has not healed… We assert the unity of the person…
the Godhead and Manhood are two natures not two Sons or two Gods’.

Apollinarius was a strong defender of the title Theotokos for Mary and
thus opposed Nestorianism. After leaving the orthodox Church in 375, Apollinarius
saw his position condemned at the Council of Constantinople, 381.

b) Nestorianism

This term is perhaps a misnomer, for Nestorius was not guilty of holding to
the heresy that bears his name. 26 He used unfortunate
expressions, but his opponent Cyril, was also guilty of that. It seems to many
modern observers that Nestorius was a victim of ecclesiastical politics and
personal rivalry. Cyril was Bishop of Alexandria, Nestorius was Bishop of Constantinople,
and the former wished to raise the prominence of his See at the expense of the
latter. N.B. Nestorius was influenced by Antiochene theology, and the rivalry
between Constantinople and Alexandria is today reflected in the separate existence
and doctrines of the Greek Orthodox and Coptic Churches, headquartered in Istanbul
and Alexandria respectively.

Nestorius was Bishop 428-431. He objected to Theotokos –’God-Bearer’
(unless balanced by anthropotokos) – being applied to Mary, as it suggested
that the Deity of Christ was derived from Mary and thus similar to Arian and
Apollinarian constructions – not the same Deity as the Father, or incomplete
humanity. He preferred the term Christokos ‘Christ-bearer’. 27
Alexandria held to Theotokos – it was a consequence of communicatio
idiomatum; and the Person was constituted by the Logos, so the Incarnate
is rightly termed God. To Nestorius, the term implied that a creature could
have been the cause of Deity, which was impossible: moreover, it implied that
the deity of the Son was of inferior sort – and thus Arian view of Son as a
creature, or Apollinarian view of incomplete humanity.

Formerly, it was held that Nestorius believed in dual personality of Christ,
but the discovery of ‘Book of Heraclides’, where he accepts the Chalcedonian
Definition, has undermined this. His position was that the two natures remain
distinct in the union. The Godhead exists in the man mind and vice versa, without
mixture or confusion. The Incarnation cannot affect the impassible Logos in
change or suffering. Christ experienced genuine human emotional development.
Such is impossible if deity and humanity fused. Thus the two natures were parallel
and undiminished as to their respective properties and economy.

For Nestorius, the term ‘nature’ was equivalent to the concrete character of
a thing. – the quality of being human or divine; e.g., humanity is circumscribed
by finiteness. Prosopon was equivalent to the external form as an individual;
nature is not an abstract concept – human nature demands a real, external body
& soul to exist. This also demands hypostasis (equivalent to concrete
subsistence), thus the human nature of Christ was not a cloak, pace ‘Word-flesh’,
but was objectively real – without dichotomising Christ, His human nature had
real personality – as did His deity of course, though there was only one Person.
Nestorius rejected Paul of Samosata’s dogma of the two Sons: the Incarnate was
a unity – God the Logos and the man are not numerically two. Never divided in
purpose or will. Thus there are not two Persons, but one prosopon, with
two ousiai - divine and human. Nestorius preferred to use ‘conjunction’,
rather than ‘union’, as the latter could imply confusion of natures.

The man was the temple in which God dwelt: it was a voluntary conjunction -
gracious condescension on the part of the divine, willing submission with regard
to the human. Christ was a single being with a single will and intelligence
-inseparable and indivisible. ‘Christ’ is the prosopon of union – the
prosopon is not identified with the eternal Logos or the man, but is
the consequence of the ‘coalescence’. With regard to the communicatio idiomatum,
the human actions of Christ should be predicated of the human nature, the divine
of the deity, but both could be predicated of the Person. The trouble occurred
because either party had differing starting-points, one stressing the distinction
of natures, the other the unity of the Person.

The actual teaching originated with Diodore, Bishop of Tarsus, 378. In opposition
to Apollinarianism, he sharply contrasted ‘the word’ and ‘the flesh’
(not ‘the man’) in the God-man Thus he distinguished tile Son of God and the
son of David – ‘the two Sons’. He seems to understate the humanity and the Union,
but the evidence is uncertain. His theology was developed by Theodore of Mopsuestia
(Cilicia, modern Turkey) 350-628. Nowadays he is seen as generally orthodox,
despite some unfortunate language, hut he was perceived by the Cyrillian party
as teaching a purely moral Union (e.g. as husband and wife form one flesh’)
and thus two persons.

As well as Cyril, Nestorius had to cope with the antagonism of monks devoted
to Mary. Together they accused him of Sabellian tendencies (i.e. that the Father,
Son and Spirit were simply successive modes of office of a unipersonal God),
or of teaching two persons. He was condemned at Ephesus in 43l, exiled and died
451 just after the Council of Chalcedon, where he felt his position was vindicated
because of emphasis of the two natures. A large part of the Syrian as well as
the Persian Church followed Nestorianism, and performed great pioneering mission
- including to China, 635. The Church is called ‘Assyrian Church of the East’,
and it does not seem to he guilty of Nestorianism, (but note its rejection of
Theotokos). Two early synod statements of faith seems to indicate that
the ‘Nestorians’ were not actually guilty of ‘Nestorianism’:

c) Monophysitism/Eutychianism.

This upholds the idea of one nature in Christ; the converse of Nestorianism.
It developed out of the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria, the adversary of Nestorius.

It should be noted that in traditional Alexandrine theology Theotokos
was a favourite term. Nestorius, who has reservations about the phrase, seemed
to Cyril propose a purely external association between the Logos
and a man. Thus the Passion was not that of God incarnate, but of a mere man.
Hence, the implication of Nestorius’ teaching was that the Eucharist was cannibalism,
since the flesh thereof was unvivified by Logos, so was that of a mere man.

The problem was accentuated by differences of language. For Antioch,
Phusis was equivalent to ‘concrete assemblage of attributes’ – the quality
of being something. For Alexandria, Phusis was equivalent to ‘concrete
individual, or independent existent’ – approximating to hypostasis, thus
virtually ‘person’. For Cyril, the incarnation was purely a matter of phases
– Jesus was the Logos before and after incarnation – but same
Logos, the only difference being that now He had flesh. As Cyril stated, ‘He
remains what he was’. Hence his renowned formula, ‘one nature and that incarnate,
of the divine Word’. Phusis here should be understood as in Alexandrine
terminology.

Cyril was intent on guarding against division in the Incarnate. ‘Flesh’
meant humanity in toto, including the rational soul. Thus, Jesus had a true,
concrete humanity. Hence, He was as truly man as He was God. The centre of this
person was the divine Logos. Thus ‘conjunction’, as favoured by Nestorius, did
not do justice to the evidence. The humanity of Christ became an hypostasis
in the hypostasis of the Logos. The body was the body of the Logos,
and the union of Logos and flesh produced a single concrete being. Thus,
whilst there was no confusion of manhood and deity, Immanuel was not
bi-personal.

It is important to safeguard Cyril against the idea that he believed that ‘one
nature’ meant the union of deity with manhood; rather, the term expresses the
singleness of the Person of Christ. Cyril did affirm the unity. The Jesus of
History was God Himself in human flesh – thus what was born of Mary was God,
because the humanity in her womb belonged to the divine Logos. Hence, it was
inaccurate to speak of ‘the man’ being ‘co-adored’; Immanuel was the Lord ‘enfleshed’,
who must be worshipped in a single adoration.

Cyril used the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum to propose that
the Logos suffered in the flesh, and that a measure of the properties of either
nature were conferred to the other; thus, the humanity being infused with life-giving
energy of Logos, became itself life-giving. However, it is vital to uphold the
impassibility of the Logos – He took on a flesh that could suffer, so the suffering
He experienced was His own. Thus, as a result of the incarnation, two distinct
natures have fused into one. The Incarnation involved ‘condescension’ (kenosis).
No change takes place in the Logos, but He deliberately limits Himself to extent
which He takes our nature upon Himself, whilst yet upholding the universe.

Kelly states that there is evidence that his later Christology, on the basis
of acknowledging the role played by the rational soul in Christ’s sufferings,
accepted the existence of ‘a second nature’ in respect to the humanity, which
made possible his compronise with moderate Antiochenes. His great concern was
to guard against the ‘separation’ of natures. 29

However, the concept particularly developed under the monk Eutyches of Constantinople.
The essence of the teaching of Eutyches is the avoidance of distinguishing ‘nature’
from personality. It is the opposite of Nestorianism – if the personality
is not dual, there can only be a single nature. This heresy is
a denial of the reality and permanence of the Lord’s humanity; rather, it is
transmuted into deity – ‘Monophysitism’. The Deity swallows-up the humanity
- not annihilating, but transforming it. After the Incarnation, there is only
one nature, God made flesh. [Before it, Christ had two]. It is
a complete incarnation – perfect man. However, His flesh was not
consubstantial with ours Christ’s body is the body of God, but he seems to mean
that it did not possess independent existence i.e. he was denying that the Eternal
Son assumed a Man rather than human nature. Nonetheless he insisted on the formula
‘one nature after the Incarnation’. Bray argues that ‘Eutyches eventually got
to the point where he almost denied any real humanity in Christ, saying that
this had been absorbed by God at the incarnation…’ 30 His theories were denounced at Constantinople, 448.

Others developed this idea – Monophysitism – to teach either the fusion of
natures, the ‘swallowing up’ of the humanity by the Deity, and even the deification
of the humanity. There were three main forms.

i) Theopaschitists – ‘God suffered’.

ii) Phthartolatrists – the human nature of Christ was, like ours, capable
of suffering, and thus worshipped what was corruptible (i.e. subject to material
corruption).

iii) Aphthartodocetists – the opposite view of the preceding position
- the divinising of the flesh of Christ. 31

Monophysitism (one nature) was condemned by the Tome of Leo, and at the Council
of Chalcedon 451. The Coptic Church of Egypt, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Armenian
Gregorian Church, and the Syrian Jacobite Church remain to a degree Monophysite.
However, a recent paper by a U.S. Coptic priest suggests that the actual differences
may have been principally semantic, a point we have noted earlier. 32
Given that semantics caused confusion even among Christians, we should not be
surprised if Muhammad and early Muslims misunderstood the Christian position,
especially if the dominant theology they encountered was Monophysite in some
form.

d) Monothelitism

Thelein –’will’. N.B. – At the time, ‘will’ meant more than volition;
it included instincts, appetites, desires and affections. Thus was Christ capable
of fear? Either it was held that the human will merged in the divine, or that
they fused. This became the official position of the Maronite Church of Lebanon
and Syria until its later union with Rome. Pope Honorius I, 625-638, was guilty
of this heresy. 33 It was condemned at the Sixth
Ecumenical Council of Constantinople 680. Christ has both a divine and a human
will, the two in perfect harmony.

N.B. The Chalcedonian definition condemned Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, and
Eutychianism, upholding the doctrine of Christ as ‘two natures in One Person’.

9. Historic Christian Creeds and Confessions

The Historic Christian position, resulting from the systematising of Biblical
data is that Jesus is One Person with two natures – divine and human. This has
been the position emphasised by the historic councils and creeds of the Church:

The Capitula of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Second Synod of Constantinople,
A.D. 553)

It can be understood from this definition that the term ‘Mother
of God’, which equally scandalises Muslims and Protestants, was not a step in
the direction of Mariolatry, nor even a statement about Mary herself in the
first analysis, but primarily a declaration that the babe to whom she gave birth
was not only human, but was also God. This does not mean that Jesus derived
His deity from Mary, or imparted His divine nature to her; rather, the rather
unfortunate term merely affirmed the deity of Christ. Nonetheless, it is a term
best avoided. The belief in the Hypostatic Union of Christ, His simultaneous
two natures, is also affirmed in later Protestant confessions of faith:

B. The Islamic view

The first thing we notice when we study the Qur’an and investigate its assertions
about Christian Christology is that what it presents as Christian dogma is something
other than what the Bible and the Historic Creeds affirm. It misrepresents
the dogma of the eternal Sonship of Christ as the equivalent of pagan gods carousing
with human females and producing semi-divine offspring, a totally false picture
of what Christians believe. The Muslim writer Suzanne Haneef makes exactly this
point is her exposition on the subject, referring to S. 2:116-117:

If Jesus were indeed God’s Son, he would be a sharer in the Godhead and
of Divine nature himself and in that case God would have simultaneously
begotten, been begotten, been born, lived as a human being, and died. Such
a notion does not merit any comment, It has much more in common with pagan
mythologies, in which ‘gods’ fathered semi-divine children by human women,
than with a true religion coming from God and based on the relationship between
the Creator and the created. Hence the claim that Jesus is God’s Son cannot
be, by its very nature, other than a false one because it contradicts the
very nature and attributes of the Creator, bringing Him down to the level
of the beings He has created. 35

As I stated in my paper An Explanation of the Trinity for Muslims, ‘Islam
accuses Christians with promoting a mere human being – Jesus, viewed simply
as a prophet – to the status of deity. However, the Christian position is actually
the opposite to some degree: Man did not become God, God took human nature alongside
His divine nature without ceasing to be God. Deity and humanity are not confused
in the One Person of Christ. Deity is not diluted, nor humanity elevated.’ This
accusation against the Christians is clear from a perusal of some of the ayat
in question:

To continue quoting from my earlier paper, ‘what the Qur’an attacks is Tritheism,
belief in three Gods. Such a dogma is completely absent from the Christian Scriptures
and from orthodox Christian tradition such as that stated at the Councils of
Nicæa (325 A.D.) and Chalcedon (451), which professed belief in the Triune
nature of the Godhead, as opposed to any tritheistic ideas.’ This is relevant
to the Christological issue since what Islam attacks is an ontological position
whereby Christ is a distinct deity from Allah, and even, according to S, 5:72
that Jesus alone is God, both positions completely at variance with the Bible
and Historic Creeds. What is absent from all the ayat relating to Jesus
is any denial of the essential, fundamental doctrine of Christianity that Christ
had two natures. We have seen from the councils and creeds that this was indeed
a crucial dogma of Christianity, yet the Qur’an never attacks this belief. It
never assaults the Christian concept that Christ was both God and Man.
Instead, it merely attacks belief in His deity. As Watt observes, Islam’s presentation
of Christian Christology is that the latter believes that

…Jesus is a deity apart from God… What is denied here is the assertion
of complete identity between Jesus and God… generally regarded as the heresy
of confusing the hypostases… In the light of the Qur’anic attack on tritheism,
it seems certain that the denial that the Messiah was the son of God was a
denial that he was a deity separate from God; and this is confirmed by the
later part of 9:30 which identifies what is denied with the views of ‘former
unbelievers’… that is presumably of the pagans. 36

Watt comments on S. 5:73, 77 and S. 4:171-69 that ‘…if these passages are
examined without parti pris, it is clear that they are not attacking the orthodox
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, but the misinterpretation of that doctrine
sometimes called “tritheism”. The great body of Christians officially
deny that they believe in three gods, and in their creeds profess their belief
in God who is one.‘ 37 If we were to employ
the ‘mirror’ argument with the Qur’an, i.e. assessing what an individual or
group believe on the basis of what its critics say about their beliefs, we would
emerge with the understanding that Christians believe that Christ is God – but
only that Christ is God. We would never encounter the tenet for which there
was such conflict and passion, even as Islam was emerging, that Christians believe
Jesus had a human nature as well as a divine nature. Since the Qur’an’s
attack on the Cross is essentially a disputation with Jewish polemics, rather
than a denial of Christian soteriology, we would never encounter the centrality
of the crucifixion as the crucial salvific event for Christians, one that would
necessitate His humanity. This omission is not just surprising, it raises the
important question: why?

The answer may lie in the Christian sect Muhammad encountered. The principal
Christian centre in Arabia was Najran, and the Encyclopaedia of Islam
holds that the prevailing Christological tendency in the area were the Monophysites. 38 Trimingham believes that the Najran Christians were Monophysites, influenced
from Abyssinia. 39 The likelihood is that Najran
received its Christian influence from Ethiopia. Yusuf Ali suggests in his commentary
on S. 27:24 that Abyssinia was the centre of origin for Christianity in Najran:

Yemen had easy access to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf by way of the
sea, as well as with Abyssinia. That accounts for the Christians of Najran
and the Jewish dynasty of kings (e.g. Zu-Nuwas, d. 525 A.D.) who persecuted
them in the century before Islam, – also for the Christian Abyssinian Governor
Abraha and his discomfiture in the year of the Prophet’s birth (S.cv.), say
570 A.D. Jewish-Christian influences were powerful in Arabia in the sixth
century of the Christian era.

Mawdudi’s introduction to S. 105 notes the Abyssinian-Byzantine alliance against
Dhu Nuwas, the fanatical anti-Christian Jewish King of Yemen, and which seems
to support the idea of Abyssinian – and thus Monophysite – influence in the area.
The fact that Abyssinia intervened because of the persecution would suggest
it had a particular interest in defending these Christians. If they were Monophysites,
we can understand why they would have been so-motivated:

… in retaliation for the persecution of the followers of the Prophet Jesus
Christ (peace be on him) in Najran by the Jewish ruler Dhu-Nuwas of Yaman,
the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia invaded Yaman and put an end to the Himyarite
rule there, and in 525 A.D. this whole land passed under Abyssinian control…
Abyssinia sent 70,000 of its troops by it across the Red Sea to Yaman.

Of course, according to the Sira, Muhammad met a delegation from Najran, and
the first Hijra was to Abyssinia, so taking all these things into account, we
can say that it is likely that the Christian theological influence Muhammad
and the early Muslims encountered was some form of Monophysitism. Whether this
was the more orthodox form that Copts today state they believe, or whether it
was indeed full-blown Eutychianism does not matter. It is quite understandable
that either Muhammad and/or the early Muslim redactors of the Qur’an would misunderstand
the Monophysite position as involving the diminishing of Christ’s humanity such
that He was only divine; after all, this was how many Christians perceived their
position! It would indeed explain why the Qur’an never attacks the Hypostatic
Union, or says to Christians ‘they do disbelieve who say that Christ is both
God and Man’.

Of course, the problem for Muslims, is that if the Qur’an misunderstands the
Biblical and Historic Christian position, this must mean that it is fallible,
and thus not genuine revelation. It also means that Muhammad and the Qur’an
were ignorant of the Biblical position on Christ’s two natures, which again
implies that the Qur’an is not divine inspiration. Most of the Qur’anic assaults
on suggested Christian Christology are more easily comprehensible if the holy
book of Islam is controverting some form of Monophysitism, in the sense that
Christ had only one nature, the divine. Interestingly, Bray suggests in regard
to Monophysites that ‘it was their brand of Christianity which in a popular
form had influenced the Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad rejected he divinity of Christ,
but he retained the Monophysite emphasis on the Virgin Birth…’ 40
It follows from this that what the Qur’an controverts is not the Christology
of the Bible, or for that matter of the Historic Creeds of the Church, but rather
a Christological error, of which most Christians were not guilty. The fact that
the Qur’an fails to recognise this undermines its claims to divine inspiration.

Conclusion

The touchstone of orthodoxy is ‘what think ye of Christ?’ In one way or another,
practically all error results from a failure to understand the nature and work
of Christ. It is absolutely crucial to the message and work of Jesus that He
is simultaneously God and Man, without confusion, mixture or bi-personal separation.
To perform the great work of salvation, He had to be both. No one argues that
the concept of the Hypostatic Union is a difficult one to understand, not least
because we have nothing in nature that is analogous to it. However, this should
not be surprising, since we are dealing with God, who is, as both Islam and
Christianity confess, incomparable and incomprehensible. The fact that finite
human minds are incapable of fully comprehending a divine miracle such as the
Hypostatic Union in no way diminishes its truth. All that this indicates is
that the finite cannot comprehend the infinite.

It is one of the clearest indications that the Qur’an is not divinely inspired
in that it fails to address what is clear Biblical doctrine – that Christ had
two natures. Christians faithful to the Biblical picture of Christ never claimed
he was a separate God from the Father, that He alone was God, or that He was
only divine, not human. The Qur’an, however, never gets to grip with what is
a crucial Christian dogma – the two natures of Christ. It never examines it,
nor condemns it. It appears ignorant of it. Yet if God is omniscient, how could
His ‘direct speech’ be unaware of it? The likelihood is that Muhammad and/or
early Qur’anic redactors misunderstood Monophysitism, and wrongly assumed that
this was Biblical Christian belief. As with the teaching about the deity of
Mary, the divine sonship of Ezra, etc., the Qur’an made a mistake. The Christ
it criticises is not the Jesus Christians worship.

References

1. Baagil, H. M., Christian-Muslim Dialogue (Revival of Islamic Heritage
   Society, Kuwait, 1984), p. 23.
2. Deedat, Ahmed, The God that never was, http://www.ais.org/~maftab/neverwas.htm
3. Berkhof, Louis, Systematic Theology, (Banner of Truth Trust, Edinburgh,
   1958, 1981 reprint), p. 29.
4. Rasheed, Asra, A Simple Call to the Worship of One God, (Jam’iat Ihyaa’
   Minhaaj al-Sunnah, Ipswich, 1994), p. 10.
5. Hodge, A. A., Evangelical Theology: A Course of Popular Lectures, (First
   published 1860; Banner of Truth Trust edition, Edinburgh, 1976), pp. 185-186.
6. Bremmer, Michael The Deity of Jesus Christ, http://members.tripod.com/~Michael_Bremmer/deity.htm
   

   ‘Walter Martin, in his classic, The Kingdom of the Cults, writes concerning
   the JW’s deceptive translation of Jn. 1.1:

   “Contrary to the translations of The Emphatic Diaglott and the New World
   Translation of the Holy Scriptures, the Greek grammatical construction leaves
   no doubt whatsoever that this is the only possible rendering of the text.
   The subject of the sentence is Word (Logos), the verb, was. There can be no
   direct object following was since according to grammatical usage intransitive
   verbs take no objects but take instead predicate nominatives which refer back
   to the subject, in this case, Word (Logos). In fact, the late New Testament
   Greek scholar, Colwell, formulated a rule which clearly states that a definite
   predicate nominative (in this case, theos – God) never takes an article when
   it precedes the verb (was) as we find in John 1:1. It is therefore easy to
   see that no article is needed for Theos (God) and to translate it a ‘god’
   is both incorrect grammar and poor Greek since Theos is the predicate nominative
   of was in the third sentence-clause of the verse and must refer back to the
   subject, Word (Logos). Christ, then, if He is the ‘Word made flesh’ (John
   1:14) can be no one else except God unless the Greek text and consequently
   God’s Word be denied.

   Jehovah’s Witnesses in their New World Translation of the Christian
   Greek Scriptures, on the appendix pages 773-77, attempt to discredit the Greek
   text on this point, for they realize that if Jesus and Jehovah are ‘One’ in
   nature, their theology cannot stand since they deny the unity of nature. The
   refutation of their arguments on this point is conclusive.

   The claim is that since the definite article is used with Theon in
   John 1.1c and not with Theos in John 1.1d, therefore the omission is designed
   to show a difference; the alleged difference being that in the first case the
   One True God (Jehovah) is meant, while in the second ‘a god,’ other than, and
   inferior to, the first is meant, this latter ‘god’ being Jesus Christ.

   On page 776b the claim is made that the rendering ‘a god’ is correct
   because ‘… all the doctrine of sacred Scriptures bears out the correctness
   of this rendering.’ This remark focuses attention on the fact that the whole
   problem involved goes far beyond this text. Scripture does in fact teach the
   full and equal Deity of Christ. Why then is so much made of this one verse?
   It is probably because of the surprise effect derived from the show of pseudo
   scholarship in the use of a familiar text. Omission of the article with Theos
   does not mean that ‘a god’ other than the one true God is meant. Let one examine
   these passages where the article is not used with Theos and see if the rendering
   ‘a god’ makes sense: Matthew 5:9; 6:24; Luke 1:35, 78; 2:40; John 1:6, 12, 13,
   18; 3:2, 21; 9:16, 33; Romans 1.7, 17, 18; 1 Corinthians 1:30; 15:10; Philippians
   2.11, 13; Titus 1:1 and many, many more. The ‘a god’ contention proves too weak
   and is inconsistent. To be consistent in this rendering of ‘a god,’ Jehovah’s
   Witnesses would have to translate every instance where the article is absent
   as a god (nominative), of a god (genitive), to or for a god (dative),etc. This
   they do not do in Matthew 5:9; 6:24; Luke 1:35, 78; John 1:6, 12, 13, 18; Romans
   1:7, 17, etc. (See the New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures and The
   Emphatic Diaglott at above mentioned references.)

   You cannot honestly render theos ‘a god’ In John 1:1, and then theou
   ‘of God’ (Jehovah), in Matthew 5.9, Luke 1:35, 78; John 1:6, etc., when theou
   is the genitive case of the same noun (second declension), without an article
   and must be rendered (following Jehovah’s Witnesses’ argument) ‘of a god’ not
   ‘of God’ as both The Emphatic Diaglott and New World Translation of the Holy
   Scriptures put it. We could list at great length, but suggest consultation of
   the Greek New Testament by either D. Erwin Nestle or Westcott & Hort, in
   conjunction with The Elements of Greek by Francis Kingsley Ball (New York: Macmillian,
   1948, pp. 7, 14) on noun endings, etc. So then if Jehovah’s Witnesses must persist
   in this fallacious ‘a god’ rendition they can at least be consistent, which
   they are not, and render every instance where the article is absent in the same
   manner. The truth of the matter is this, that Jehovah’s Witnesses use and remove
   the articular emphasis whenever and wherever it suits their fancy regardless
   of grammatical laws to the contrary. In a translation as important as God’s
   Word, every law must be observed. Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been consistent
   in their observances of those laws.

   The writers of the claim have exhibited another trait common to Jehovah’s
   Witnesses, that of half quoting or misquoting a recognized authority to bolster
   their ungrammatical renditions. On page 776 of the appendix to the New World
   Translation of the Christian Greek Scriptures when quoting Dr. Robertson’s words,
   ‘among the ancient writers ho theos was used of the god of absolute religion
   in distinction from the mythological gods,’ they fail to note that in the second
   sentence following, Dr. Robertson says, ‘In the New Testament, however, while
   we have pros ton theon (John 1:1, 2) it is far more common to find simply theos,
   especially in the Epistles.’

   In other words, the writers of the New Testament frequently do not
   use the article with theos and yet the meaning is perfectly clear in the context,
   namely that the One True God is intended. Let one examine the following references
   where in successive verses and even in the same sentence the article is used
   with one occurrence of theos and not with another form, and it will be absolutely
   clear that no such drastic inferences can be drawn from John’s usage in John
   1:1, 2 (Matthew 4:3, 4; 12:28; 28:43; Luke 20:37, 38; John 3:2; 13:3; Acts 5:29,
   30; Romans 1:7, 8, 17-19; 2:16, 17; 3:5, 22, 23; 4:2, 3, etc.).

   The doctrine of the article is important in Greek; it is not used
   indiscriminately. But we are not qualified to be sure in all cases what is intended.
   Dr. Robertson is careful to note that it is only of recent years that a really
   scientific study of the article has been made (p. 755, A. T. Robertson). The
   facts are not all known and no such drastic conclusion, as the writers of the
   appendix note, should he dogmatically affirmed.

   It is nonsense to say that a simple noun can be rendered ‘divine,’
   and that one without the article conveys merely the idea of quality (pp. 773,
   774, appendix to the New World Translation of the Christian Greek Scriptures).
   The authors of this note themselves later render the same noun theos as ‘a god’
   not as ‘a quality.’ This is a self-contradiction in the context. In conclusion,
   the position of the writers of this note is made clear at page 774 of the appendix
   to the New World Translation. of the Christian Greek Scriptures; according to
   them it is ‘unreasonable’ that the Word (Christ) should be the God with whom
   He was (John 1:1). Their own manifestly erring reason is made the criterion
   for determining Scriptural truth. One need only note the obvious misuse in their
   quotation from Dana and Mantey (the New World Translation of the Christian.
   Greek Scriptures, pp. 774, 775). Mantey clearly means that the Word was Deity
   in accord with the overwhelming testimony of Scripture, but the writers have
   dragged in the interpretation ‘a god’ to suit their own purpose, which purpose
   is the denial of Christ’s Deity, and as a result a denial of the Word of God.
   The late Dr. Mantey publicly stated that he was quoted out of` context and he
   personally wrote the Watchtower, declaring ‘there is no statement in our grammar
   that was ever meant to imply that ‘a god’ was a permissible translation in John
   1 :1 and it is neither scholarly nor reasonable to translate John 1:1 The Word
   was a god’(Michael Van Buskirk, The Scholastic Dishonesty of the Watchtower,
   P.O. Box 2067, Costa Mesa, CA 92626: CARIS, 1976, p. 11).” (The Kingdom
   of the Cults, P. 85-87)’

7. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, pp. 321-322.
8. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 323.
9. Murray, John, ‘The Person of Christ’, in Collected Writings, Vol. 2,
   Systematic Theology, (Banner of Truth Trust, Edinburgh, 1977), p. 136.
10. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 322.
11. Hodge, Evangelical Theology, (1890, Banner of Truth edition 1976, Edinburgh),
    p. 189.
12. Milne, Bruce, Know the Truth, (IVP, Leicester, 1982), p. 145.
13. Lane, A. N. S. ‘Christology beyond Chalcedon’, in Christ the Lord:
    Studies in Christology presented to Donald Guthrie, edited by H. H. Rowdon,
    (IVP, Leicester, 1982), p. 272.
14. Olyott, Stuart, Son of Mary, Son of God: What the Bible teaches about
    the person of Christ, (Evangelical Press, Welwyn, 1984), pp. 111-112.
15. Hodge, A. A., Outlines of Theology, (1860, 1879 enlarged edition, Banner
    of Truth edition 1972, Edinburgh), pp. 188-189.
16. Olyott, Son of Mary, Son of God, p. 111.
17. Hammond, T. C., In understanding be men, (IVP, Leicester, 1968, sixth
    edition, revised and updated by David F. Wright), p. 101.
18. Olyott, Son of Mary, Son of God, p. 117.
19. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 319.
20. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 319.
21. Olyott, Son of Mary, Son of God, p. 117.
22. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 319.
23. Chadwick, Henry, The Early Church, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967),
    p. 210.
24. Hodge, A. A., Outlines of Theology, p. 383.
25. Kelly, J. N. D., Early Christian Doctrines, (Harper & Row, 2^nd
    Edition, 1960), p. 290.
26. Kelly, ibid., p. 292.
27. Kelly, ibid., pp. 312, 316.
28. Bray, Gerald, Creeds, Councils and Christ, (IVP, Leicester, 1984),
    p. 155.
29. Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East Commission on Inter-Church
    Relations and Education Development, http://www.cired.org/faith/christ.html
30. Kelly, ibid., p. 323.
31. Bray, Creeds, Councils and Christ, p. 158.
32. Berkhof, Louis, The History of Christian Doctrines, (1937, Banner of
    Truth Trust edition, Edinburgh, 1969), p. 108.
33. Wahba, Fr. Matthias F., St. Antonius Coptic Orthodox Church, Hayward,
    California, USA, http://pharos.bu.edu/cn/articles/MonophysitismReconsidered.txt

    Monophysitism: Reconsidered

    Introduction:

    The Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, in which I am a priest, is one of the Oriental Orthodox Churches. These churches are the Coptic, Armenian, Syrian, Ethiopian, and the Malankara Indian Churches. The common element among them is their non-acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon of AD 451. Accordingly they prefer to be called ‘Non-Chalcedonian Orthodox Churches.’

    The Council of Chalcedon caused a big schism within the church which lasted until the present. In addition, after the Arab invasion in the seventh century, the churches lost communication with each other. Through this long period, the non-Chalcedonians were accused of Eutychianism, and called ‘Monophysites’, meaning that they believe in one single nature of our Lord Jesus Christ. They never accepted this idea considering it a heresy. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the issue…

    Monophysitism and the Council of Chalcedon

    … The definitions of the Tome were composed in a way that it could be interpreted by different persons, each in his own way. It is known that Nestorius, who was still alive in 451, accepted the Tome of Leo, while the Alexandrines rejected it.

    The Council of Chalcedon, which is believed to have condemned Eutyches, did not deal with him but with Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria. Eutyches himself was not present at the council. Scholars state that Dioscorus was deprived of office on procedural grounds and not on account of erroneous belief. At Chalcedon Dioscorus strongly declared, ‘If Eutyches holds notions disallowed by the doctrines of the Church, he deserves not only punishment but even the fire. But my concern is for the catholic and apostolic faith, not for any man whomsoever.’ …

    Two Different Traditions

    Dioscorus, then, was not a heretic. The majority of the bishops who attended the Council of Chalcedon, as scholars indicate, believed that the traditional formula of faith received from St. Athanasius was the ‘one nature of the Word of God.’ This belief is totally different from the Eutychian concept of the single nature (i.e. Monophysite). The Alexandrian theology was by no means docetic. Neither was it Apollinarian, as stated clearly. It seems that the main problem of the Christological formula was the divergent interpretation of the issue between the Alexandrian and the Antiochian theology. While Antioch formulated its Christology against Apollinarius and Eutyches, Alexandria did against Arius and Nestorius. At Chalcedon, Dioscorus refused to affirm the ‘in two natures’ and insisted on the ‘from two natures.’ Evidently the two conflicting traditions had not discovered an agreed theological standpoint between them.

    Mia Physis

    The Church of Alexandria considered as central the Christological mia physis formula of St. Cyril ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word’. The Cyrillian formula was accepted by the Council of Ephesus in 431. It was neither nullified by the Reunion of 433, nor condemned at Chalcedon. On the contrary, it continued to be considered an orthodox formula. Now what do the non-Chalcedonians mean by the mia physis, the ‘one incarnate nature?’. They mean by mia one, but not ‘single one’ or ‘simple numerical one,’ as some scholars believe. There is a slight difference between mono and mia. While the former suggests one single (divine) nature, the latter refers to one composite and united nature, as reflected by the Cyrillian formula. St. Cyril maintained that the relationship between the divine and the human in Christ, as Meyendorff puts it, ‘does not consist of a simple cooperation, or even interpenetration, but of a union; the incarnate Word is one, and there could be no duplication of the personality of the one redeemer God and man.’

    Mia Physis and Soteriology

    ‘The Alexandrian Christology’, writes Frances Young, ‘is a remarkably clear and consistent construction, especially when viewed within its soteriological context. Mia physis, for the Alexandrians, is essential for salvation. The Lord is crucified, even though His divinity did not suffer but His humanity did. The sacrifice of the Cross is attributed to the Incarnate Son of God, and thus has the power of salvation.

    Common Faith

    It is evident that both the Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians agree on the following points:

    1. They all condemn and anathematize Nestorius, Apollinarius and Eutyches.
    2. The unity of the divinity and humanity of Christ was realized from the
       moment of His conception, without separation or division and also without
       confusing or changing.
    3. The manhood of Christ was real, perfect and had a dynamic presence.
    4. Jesus Christ is one Prosopon and one Hypostasis in real oneness and not
       mere conjunction of natures; He is the Incarnate Logos of God.
    5. They all accept the communicatio idiomatum (the communication of idioms),
       attributing all the deeds and words of Christ to the one hypostasis, the
       Incarnate Son of God…

    I conclude that the term ‘monophysitism’ does not reflect the real belief
    of the non-Chalcedonians. They prefer not to be called ‘monophysites,’ as
    far as the term may be misunderstood. They believe in one nature ‘out of two’,
    ‘one united nature’, a ‘composite nature’ or ‘one incarnate nature and not
    a ‘single nature’. There is no evidence that the term was used during the
    fifth century. Most probably it was introduced later in a polemic way on behalf
    of the Chalcedonian Churches. However, considering the past, the non-Chalcedonians
    are better to be called ‘mia-physites’ than ‘monophysites’…

34. Bettenson, Henry, Documents of the Christian Church, (Oxford University
    Press, London, 1963), p. 73.
35. Haneef, Suzanne, What everyone should know about Islam and Muslims,
    (Kazi Publications, Lahore, 1979), p. 177.
36. Watt, William Montgomery, Early Islam: Collected Articles, (Edinburgh
    University Press, Edinburgh, 1990), p. 68.
37. Watt, Early Islam, p. 67.
38. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. VII, p. 872.
39. Trimingham, J. Spencer, Christianity among the Arabs in Pre-Islamic
    Times, (Longman, London, 1979), pp. 294, 298.
40. Bray, Creeds, Councils and Christ, p. 167.